Despite rising economic inequality, particularly since the 1970s and the 2008 financial crisis, demands for more redistribution and policy measures to combat it have remained modest at best. Yet economic inequality is known to have significant societal and health consequences: more unequal societies tend to experience higher levels of social stress and a greater prevalence of health and social problems (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010). One would therefore expect demands for redistribution to be stronger. However, the relationship between rising economic inequality and the demand for redistribution is empirically weak (Jost, 2003). Is this because individuals have too little information about economic inequality? Or, are citizens aware of economic inequality but still do not necessarily ask for more redistribution?

This blog entry seeks to examine this apparent paradox in both France and Great Britain by asking why public demand for redistribution does not increase in line with rising economic inequality as an influential standard economic model would predict (Meltzer & Richard, 1981). In this vein, it seems that understanding the determinants of the perception of economic inequality is essential in order to explain individual attitudes towards redistribution and, as a consequence, the resulting political dynamics. Therefore, this blog entry also discusses cognitive shortcuts that shape the perception of economic inequality in these two countries.

Case studies: France and Great Britain

According to Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology (1990), France and Great Britain exemplify two distinct welfare state models: the liberal and the conservative model. On the one hand, Great Britain is considered a liberal welfare state due to the freedom granted to the market, low levels of redistribution, and strong liberal norms aimed at a rapid return to employment. On the other hand, France is considered a conservative welfare state: this model mainly aims to preserve status differentials. This means that benefits, resulting from individual contributions to social security, are calculated in such a way that, upon retirement or unemployment, the individual maintains a standard of living proportional to their previous position in the labour market.

Thus, the liberal model tends to result in higher levels of economic inequality than the conservative model, although in our case studies both countries are characterized by structurally relatively high levels of economic inequality. First, in terms of wealth inequality in France, the top 10% of households own nearly half of the national wealth, while in Great Britain, they own 43% (Table 1). Second, in terms of income inequality, Great Britain is more unequal than France. The Gini index, which ranges from 0 to 1 (with 0 representing perfect equality), is 0.29 in France and 0.36 in Great Britain.

Table 1: Income and wealth inequality in France and Great Britain

Country	Gini Coefficient	Top 10% Wealth Share	Bottom 50% Wealth Share
France	0.29	~50%	~8%
Great Britain	0.36	~43%	~9%

Source: OECD, 2024 and INSEE, 2024, as cited in Bastias et al., 2025

Based on previous empirical studies, we can formulate several expectations. First of all, people are expected to be aware of economic inequality, but they underestimate them or misperceive them because they rely more on subjective social comparisons and localized experiences rather than on objective indicators (Condon & Wichowsky, 2020; Gimpelson et al., 2018; Zmerli, 2025). As a consequence, these misperceptions can diminish demands for redistribution. This tendency may be stronger in Great Britain, where prevalent liberal welfare norms are more conducive to normalise higher levels of economic inequality (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

Secondly, greater access to accurate information about economic inequality does not necessarily result in an increase in demands for redistribution, as individuals tend to invoke a meritocratic discourse that justifies the social order (Piketty, 2020). Such narratives may be particularly prevalent in Great Britain due to its liberal welfare regime, which places greater emphasis on individual responsibility and market success (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

Thirdly, individuals are also expected to perceive economic inequality as primarily affecting the very rich and the very poor rather than themselves. According to social comparison theories, people mainly compare themselves to individuals with similar socioeconomic backgrounds, which reinforces the perception of belonging to a broader middle class and distances inequality from everyday personal experiences (Lebrand et al., 2020).

Finally, respondents in Great Britain are expected to express stronger feelings of helplessness and frustration regarding economic inequality than French participants. Higher levels of inequality and stronger liberal norms may reinforce the perception that inequality is inevitable and difficult to change collectively.

Methodology

The subsequent analyses are based on Work Package 1 of the POLINEQUAL project.

This work package involved data collected through sixteen online focus group discussions conducted in France and Great Britain by Kantar in 2021/22. All focus group participants were asked a series of questions about the signs, signals, heuristics, cues or indicators that influence their perception of wealth and income inequality at various levels of personal proximity, such as neighbourhood, city, region and country. They then were asked about the impact of the media, political parties, and private discussions on the formation of their perceptions, as well as the emotions they feel when they think about economic inequality and who, if at all, they think should do something about it. Before and after the focus group discussions, participants were also asked to complete a short questionnaire regarding their attitudes towards the welfare state, their ideological beliefs, and their preferences concerning redistribution. Although not representative or generalisable, the results of these small surveys provided interesting insights.

Economic inequality that is visible but misread

1. Participants generally rely on visual signs to assess economic  inequality

Individuals seem to rely heavily on visual cues to assess economic inequality. Their opinions are not based on the objective, measurable indicators typically used by economists, such as the Gini coefficient, but rather on a set of impressions to which the participants assign meaning. Our focus group participants rely, for instance, on car models, housing types, shops, or clothing to assess the level of economic inequality in their personal environment. However, in the French groups in particular, several participants point out that appearances can be quite deceptive, as one of them notes:

Annelise (France_203): “You could be wearing designer clothes, living in a small apartment, and not making much money; it just depends on what each person prioritizes. (…)”

Participants are apparently also quite aware of the limitations of impressions and visual cues when it comes to assessing economic inequality. Nevertheless, they do not claim to rely solely on visual cues: when asked, “When you think about your own knowledge of income and wealth inequality in [country], would you say it is based more on your own experiences and observations, on other sources, or on a mix of the two?”, participants tend to answer “a mix of both”. They cite, for example, the media and social media, as well as discussions with their peers, as factors that shape their opinions.

2. “Man this place is bourgeois”: People feel economic inequality more than they define it

For most participants, economic inequality is not first understood through statistics, but through a vague and immediate feeling. When asked based on what cues or signs they think there are, many people express a general sense of inequality. Many respondents in both countries simply stated that “it’s obvious” that there are inequalities, without being initially able to explain why. In both France and Great Britain, some participants describe economic inequality through the way individuals behave, which could be defined as a habitus (Bourdieu, 2003). They mention attitudes, ways of speaking, or dressing that give them the feeling of belonging – or not – to certain spaces. This sense is based on internalized social codes, which allow an individual to quickly identify the more or less “bourgeois” or “working class” character of a place, as one of the participants also puts it:

Anthony (France_202 bis): “Well… yeah, for example, if you go up to Lille or places like that, you realize right away… you can tell as soon as… as soon as you get to the station, as soon as you step outside, the first few steps you take in a city – it’s obvious. From one city to another, you find yourself thinking, “Man, this place is bourgeois.”

Economic inequality is visible not only in material conditions but also in everyday interactions and impressions that reflect an internalized social order. For participants, this set of visual cues and “feelings” allows them to draw invisible boundaries that are internalized and experienced within the physical space. In Great Britain, for example, some individuals distinguish certain places “where you shouldn’t go” from others where it is pleasant to visit:

Alexander (Great Britain FG14): “(…) There’s another town called Aldershot, which is completely dead. All the shops are closed, it’s got no atmosphere whatsoever, you know.”

In this passage, Alexander uses the word “atmosphere” to describe the town of Aldershot, illustrating his view of economic inequality. It thus refers to vague cues that are difficult to put into words but are socially internalized and shared. However, this feeling does not come entirely out of nowhere: it is, in a second instance, linked to concrete cues, such as the closure of shops in Alexander’s case. Economic inequality is first perceived in a subjective way, before being partially objectified based on visible elements.

Inequality is thus filtered through subjective perceptions that only partially reflect economic realities. The difficulty in explicitly identifying the indicators, signs, and signals of economic inequality may also stem from the fact that this is likely the first time the question has been posed to them in such a way.

Perceiving economic inequality from the middle: the middle-class misperceptions and their consequences

1. Participants think about economic inequality as extreme and distant

When discussing economic inequality, participants generally cite extreme cases of inequality. Although the very wealthy are mentioned, participants more often refer to the very poor. These two economic groups, i.e. the very wealthy and the very poor, are frequently contrasted: for example, they might mention luxury boutiques alongside situations involving homeless people. In France, in particular, participants focus on the importance of “lifting people out of poverty” to reduce economic inequality, and show relative indifference toward the very wealthy. This attitude is also found in Great Britain, but to a lesser extent.

This perspective completely obscures other forms economic inequality can take, leading them to overlook more common and widespread forms of economic disparity. As a result, participants tend to view economic inequality as occurring at the most extreme margins of society – and thus as a situation that, often, does not concern them.

This pattern can be better understood through the framework developed by Galmand and Payne (2024). According to the authors’ arguments, individuals compare themselves to one another; this is essential for forming an opinion about the social world and one’s own place in the social order. On the one hand, upward comparison (i.e., comparing oneself to individuals who have more wealth or power than oneself) can, under certain conditions, heighten the perception of economic inequality. However, upward comparison entails significant cognitive and emotional costs for individuals, in terms of anxiety or feelings of depression for example, partly because it makes them aware of their own inferior position in the social order. These costs, coupled with the rarity of interactions with people who are much wealthier or more powerful than oneself, mean that individuals are less likely to compare themselves with people who are wealthier or more powerful. On the other hand, downward comparisons with those perceived to be worse off are facilitated by social contexts. They provide affective reassurance and contribute to the stabilization of meritocratic interpretations of inequality, by framing one’s own position as deserved. As a result, these comparisons tend to reduce redistributive preferences.

2. Middle class illusion and demand for redistribution

Therefore, even though participants acknowledge that society is unequal, they generally place themselves – rightly or wrongly – in the middle class. Data from the questionnaire distributed at the beginning and the end of the focus group discussions show that 70% of participants in both countries identify as middle class, when combining those who identified as “lower middle class” (23%), “middle class” (27%) and “upper middle class” (20%). This finding is confirmed by the statements of most participants in the focus groups. We do not have actual data on their income levels though, nor sufficient data on their educational background to confirm their statements. However, all respondents answered the question “Which of the descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?”. In response to this question, 70% do not find their current income sufficient to live comfortably, whilst only 30% stated that they were living comfortably on their current income. The majority therefore identify as middle class despite facing financial difficulties, which means that the social class they identify with does not necessarily correspond entirely to their actual financial circumstances.

The literature has shown the difficulty individuals have in situating themselves within the social hierarchy: the wealthy tend to underestimate their socioeconomic position, while the poor tend to overestimate it (Condon & Wichowsky, 2020). This may also stem from the fact that individuals generally compare themselves to people with a socioeconomic status similar to their own, such as friends, colleagues, or family. Thus, this can give them a biased view of social reality, leading them to believe that they are part of a vast middle class (Galmand & Payne, 2024), while inequality is implicitly framed as affecting a distant “other.”

Thus, seeing themselves as middle class and inequality as something that affects only ‘others’, i.e., the very poor or the very rich, can result in lower demands for redistribution.

Individuals tend to use arguments that justify economic inequality

This perceived individual distance from inequality shapes the way individuals make sense of inequality itself, which might weaken redistributive demands. Thus, even though participants acknowledge the existence of economic inequality, they frequently rely on narratives that legitimize and justify it.

Chantal (France_203): “(…) I still agree with Annelise that, unfortunately, we need it (talking about economic inequality). That’s just how the system works – without the poor, there wouldn’t be any rich people, really. So it can’t work any other way. (…)”

In this example, Chantal views economic inequality as inevitable and necessary for society to function. This type of discourse can help to alleviate the cognitive discomfort associated with acknowledging inequality: viewing them as necessary and legitimizing everyone’s place in the social order can have a reassuring effect. Conversely, considering that this order is unjust and that inequality could be avoided entails a much higher emotional and cognitive ‘cost’ (Jost, 2003).

Similarly, participants focus on the most vulnerable when discussing what could be done to make society more equitable. This is a topic that comes up regularly among participants. The issue of redistribution and the very wealthy is rarely addressed, or not at all, in most focus groups. Instead, participants focus on the individual responsibility of the poorest people. They frequently refer to meritocratic arguments: this type of discourse attributes inequality to the behaviour of the most vulnerable individuals, setting aside structural mechanisms and the role of the wealthiest.

Annelise (France_203): “A doctor who owns a villa – well, he’s earned it… there’s nothing wrong with that. A top lawyer who’s made it big – it didn’t happen on its own, so, uh, it’s only natural.”

It thus contributes to normalizing existing disparities and making them more acceptable by framing them within a meritocratic logic. This rhetoric echoes media narratives on economic inequality, in which structural causes are set aside and disparities are viewed as the inevitable consequences of a meritocratic society (Grisold & Preston, 2020).

However, more British than French participants acknowledge that “hard work” alone is often not enough to “succeed”. They often point to the unequal distribution of opportunities in Great Britain, particularly the fact that these opportunities are distributed regardless of individual effort.

Sandy (Great Britain FG13 ): “These [poor people] are people that try and work hard, but you know, the system or the loopholes are not there to benefit them. Do you know what I mean? They’re there to benefit the rich and the elite.”

For their part, more French respondents blame the supposed lack of effort on the part of those in the most precarious situations than British respondents, even though, paradoxically, they also say that it is the government that must act to address inequality when asked.

How citizens emotionally respond to economic inequality: implications for political involvement

1. What do citizens feel when they think about economic inequality?

Although some participants put forward arguments justifying economic inequality, nearly all participants report feeling negative emotions toward them, such as sadness, anger, or helplessness. These emotions are reported both during the focus group discussions and in the survey questionnaires.

In France, two main emotions in response to economic inequality were widely reported by participants in the survey: powerlessness and sadness. Other feelings, such as frustration or anger, lagged far behind. In Great Britain, by contrast, participants expressed a wider range of emotions regarding economic inequality. Four emotions clearly stand out here: helplessness, frustration, powerlessness, and anger. Other emotions, such as compassion, hopelessness, and sadness are less prevalent. One emotion shared by both nationalities is powerlessness, although French participants are nearly twice as likely to report it. Frustration is also among the main emotions in both countries, although it is reported nearly twice as often by British participants.

Table 2: Number of participants choosing the emotion they feel the most toward economic  inequality

Emotion	France	Great Britain	Total N
Anger	3	8	11
Powerlessness	16	8	24
Anxiety	1	0	1
Compassion	2	5	7
Frustration	5	9	14
Guilt	0	1	1
Hate	1	0	1
Helplessness	2	10	12
Hopelessness	2	3	5
Hostility	1	0	1
Indifference	1	0	1
Sadness	14	3	17
Shame	1	1	2
Can’t choose	1	0	1
Total N	50	48	98

Note: Depicted are the frequencies based on Q39_2: “And among the feelings you selected in the previous question, which is the most important?”, referring to Q38_1: “When you think about inequalities in income and wealth, what kind of emotions do you feel? Please choose no more than 3 of the following propositions”.

The literature offers several possible explanations for these differences in emotional responses to inequality. First of all, these responses are not linked to actual income and wealth disparities, but rather to often inaccurate perceptions of them (Gimpelson et al., 2018). Citizens, whether French or British, have a very vague idea of the actual distribution of income and wealth in their country. The British, however, have a slightly more accurate idea than the French (Ibid.). Furthermore, the literature suggests that emotions regarding inequality are partly determined by societal norms and beliefs about justice. Finally, the sense of fairness also depends on how one positions oneself relative to others (Ibid.).

2. Powerlessness and withdrawal: emotions that discourage demand for redistribution and mobilization

Numerous studies link emotions felt in response to a situation which is perceived to be unfair with the likelihood of acting upon it. The dominant sentiment in both countries though is powerlessness if we also assign helplessness to the realm of powerlessness. According to the “passionate economist” theory (Langer et al., 2015, as cited in Jost et al., 2018), individuals weigh the costs and benefits of their participation based on perceived group effectiveness. A high level of powerlessness suggests low confidence in a movement’s ability to succeed and achieve its goals. This low perceived collective efficacy can discourage physical mobilization. These findings are consistent with appraisal theory, which suggests that emotions, such as helplessness and sadness, are linked to a sense of lack of control, which generally motivates avoidance or withdrawal from mobilization (Bastias & Zmerli, 2025). Similarly, frustration, which is widely reported in Great Britain, tends to motivate withdrawal rather than collective action against an unjust system in a liberal welfare state (ibid.). Anger, by contrast, has ambivalent effects on mobilization: it is negatively correlated with participation, whereas moral outrage (indignation directed at perceived injustice) is systematically associated in a positive way with collective mobilization (Langer et al., 2015, as cited in Jost et al., 2018).

In short, the dominant emotions in both France and Great Britain are not conducive to motivate political action. Instead, they appear to encourage withdrawal. This could, in part, help explain why, despite rising economic inequality, citizens may be less likely to demand more redistribution.

Conclusion

Our findings, first, confirmed that people are aware of economic inequality, but they often underestimate or misperceive it by assigning it to the most extreme cases, i.e., the richest, but above all the poorest. Indeed, participants assess economic inequality through subjective cues that they often misinterpret, leading them to position themselves as part of a broader middle class. However, contrary to our expectations, the qualitative method used here does not allow us to conclude that British participants underestimate economic inequality more than French participants do. Quite the contrary: British respondents often appeared more aware of inequality in their immediate environment.

Second, our findings suggest that the weak demand for redistribution is not primarily explained by inaccurate knowledge of inequality itself. Indeed, economic inequality is often taken for granted by participants, with some elements of ideological justification in their discourse (“it can’t work another way”). This leads us to confirm our expectation that greater knowledge about economic inequality does not increase demand for redistribution, as individuals invoke a meritocratic discourse that justifies the social order. Nevertheless, contrary to our expectations, such narratives were more prevalent in France than in Great Britain. French participants often referred to “assistanat” to justify economic inequality, while British participants often pointed to the unequal distribution of opportunities in their country, particularly the fact that these opportunities are distributed regardless of individual effort.

Third, we cannot fully confirm our third expectation. It is true that individuals tend to view economic inequality as occurring at the most extreme margins of society. Yet when asked about the emotions they feel when thinking about economic inequality, participants rarely expressed indifference toward inequality itself. Rather, many appeared emotionally concerned with inequality while still perceiving it as something that primarily affects “others,” especially the very poor. Participants were far less concerned with wealth concentration among the richest groups

Our findings therefore only partially confirm our final expectation. British participants did express higher levels of helplessness, frustration, and anger regarding economic inequality. However, French respondents reported significantly higher levels of powerlessness and sadness which are less likely to foster political engagement.

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